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I. Introduction
Why and how do we see the complex interplay of competition and 
cooperation on environmental issues in Asia and the Pacific? The Asia-Pacific 
region has been the growth center of the global economy, and the center of the 
great acceleration in the destruction of the natural environment. Therefore, it is 
important to understand how competition can be transformed into cooperation. 
The introductory section overviews the evolution of competition and cooperation 
in environmental issues and a framework of analysis. The following sections 
analyze the cases of climate change, biodiversity, and whaling. The concluding 
section draws some policy implications.
1. Competition and Cooperation in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements
Environmental issues can be roughly grouped into four categories: 
atmosphere, geosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere. This article will compare 
three environmental issues: climate change, biodiversity, and whaling, 
respectively, as atmosphere, biosphere on the geosphere, and biosphere under 
the hydrosphere. Environmental destruction is conceptualized as the tragedy of 
the commons within and across the territorial states, and there are international 
agreements addressing environmental issues beyond the territorial airspace, 
land, and waters. Competition and cooperation for the main multilateral 
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environmental agreements (MEAs) have been developed with the five UN 
environmental conferences as thresholds: the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP)’s 
Nairobi conference in 1982, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002, and the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) in 2012.
Transboundary environmental problems were the main agenda at the 
UNCHE. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution was 
adopted by the Atlantic countries in 1979, but no equivalent agreement was 
arranged in the Asia-Pacific region. MEAs on transboundary migratory species, 
the Ramsar Convention of 1971 and the Bonn Convention of 1979, were also 
adopted. The US took the lead in forming the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) of 1973, and in 
adopting a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling, although the 
International Whaling Committee (IWC) rejected it in 1972.
The year 1982 saw the increased role of developing countries in multilateral 
environmental diplomacy. The session of a special character of the UNEP 
Governing Council was held in Nairobi, where the first UN organization was 
headquartered in Africa. The World Charter for Nature was also adopted by the 
UN General Assembly by the initiative of the developing world. In the 
worldization process of environmental problems, the US and Canada took a 
mixed attitude. The US initially opposed regulating the ozone-depleting 
substances but shifted to advancing the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer of 1985, and the Montreal Protocol of 1987. On the other hand, 
the US did not sign the 1983 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. The moratorium on commercial whaling 
was adopted by the IWC in 1982, but Canada withdrew from the IWC.
Environmental issues have been globalized since the UNCED. While the 
UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention on 
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Biological Diversity (CBD) were adopted in 1992, a global forest treaty was not 
adopted and the adoption of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification was 
delayed until 1994. The US did not sign the CBD in 1992 but signed it in 1993, 
although it has not been submitted for ratification by the US Senate. The US 
signed the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, but the US Senate did not ratify it.
After the WSSD, climate negotiations got off track. While the EU and 
Australia bound themselves to the second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Canada withdrew from it and Japan committed to the Cancun 
Agreements instead. Japan hosted the Nagoya conference on biodiversity in 
2010 when the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) and the 
Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety were adopted.
The Rio+20 conference provided a new momentum with the adoption of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement on climate change in 
2015 with the cooperation of China and the United States. US President Obama 
became the promoter for the Minamata Convention on Mercury as well as the 
Paris Agreement. However, US President Trump declared in 2017 the US 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Australia submitted to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) a complaint against Japan’s scientific whaling, and, in 
2014, the ICJ held that Japan should cease all whaling. Japan withdrew from the 
IWC in 2019.
2. Explaining Competition and Cooperation
Why can the complex interplay of competition and cooperation as such be 
seen in the Asia-Pacific? Barkdull and Harris (2009) summarize the existing 
approaches to the study of environmental foreign policy with a matrix of the 
three basic causal variables (power, interests, and ideas) and the three levels of 
analysis (society, state, and international system). The three causal variables in 
the international system are emphasized differently by realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. This article hypothesizes that cooperation in forming MEAs can 
be seen when a sufficient combination of all the three main variables exist at the 
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system level, whereas competition occurs when at least one necessary variable 
of a key state and/or society is missing.
The active environmental leadership by the US during the 1970s has faded 
since the 1980s, in accordance with the relative decline of its hegemonic power. 
The power transition from the US to China is also to be noted. However, the US 
still exerts an influence in some MEAs, and therefore a careful understanding of 
changing contexts will be needed across different environmental issues.
The key players include countries outside the region, especially the EU, 
which is often regarded as an environmental leader. The United Kingdom’s 
participation in the EU customs union triggered the loss of the preferential 
trading status of the Commonwealth members, including Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia, and their shift to the regionalism of 
Asia and the Pacific. Intensified economic integration of North America also 
triggered interregional dialogue, as shown in the Asia-Europe Meeting. Thus, 
Asia-Pacific dynamism is closely related to the EU presence and interests.
Ideas include both norms and scientific knowledge. Since the UNCHE, a 
series of environmental norms and principles have been recognized, especially 
related to the three dimensions of sustainable development. As symbolized in 
the official name of the UNCHE, the conference emphasized the human (social) 
and environmental dimensions. The emphasis of the Nairobi conference was 
placed on the environment because it was the UNEP conference. In response to 
the request from developing countries, the Rio Summit focused on both the 
environment and development. By the WSSD, the three dimensions—economic, 
social, and environmental—of sustainable development were widely recognized. 
The Rio+20 conference reemphasized the environmental and economic 
dimensions, as shown in the slogan of “green economy.” There was also the 
recognition of another pillar of the “institutional framework for sustainable 
development”. Epistemic community theory notes that the unification of 
scientific and policy communities is the fourth pillar. In a similar way, this 
article looks at the gap between the two conceptual frameworks: the “limit to 
growth” model that identifies sustainability as the overlapping of the three 
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pillars, and the “prosperity within limitations” model that seeks prosperity 
within the planetary boundaries scientifically identified (Steffen et al., 2015).
II. Climate Change
1. Competition and Cooperation in the UNFCCC
When the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were negotiated, some key 
negotiation groups were formed. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
formed by states threatened by sea-level rise, called for a highly ambitious target 
for mitigation. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and China, 
however, argued that the protocol negotiations were premature and only a small 
number of developing countries expressed support for the AOSIS proposal. 
Among the developed countries, the EU, in particular, Germany, took a proactive 
position and submitted a proposal that included reporting commitments of 
developing countries and emission-limiting commitments for some advanced 
developing countries. However, G-77 and China rejected the German proposal. 
Thus, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility implied for the 
initial responsibility for developing countries to be exempted. A group of non-
EU developed countries, namely, Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, 
Norway, and New Zealand, was reluctant to strengthen the UNFCCC regime.
A compromise in the Kyoto Protocol negotiation resulted on the cap-and-
trade approach. The legally binding cap was set for developed countries to 
reduce their emission of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) by at least 5% below 
1990 levels during the first commitment period 2008–12. Differentiated caps 
were set, ranging from an 8% decrease to a 10% increase. Flexibility in the 
Kyoto mechanism included emission-trading, joint implementation, and clean 
development mechanism (CDM), the last of which was conducted within the 
territories of developing countries. Projects for CDM were concentrated in 
China.
A negotiation process for a binding agreement for the period from 2013, that 
was to be finalized in 2009 in Copenhagen, failed. However, the Cancun 
Agreements reached in 2010 consisted of the two tracks for a second 
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commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the long-term mitigation 
framework with the pledge to reduce and review their nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions. Canada denounced the Kyoto Protocol and Japan, New 
Zealand, and Russia did not agree to set up their emission reduction targets in 
the second commitment period, arguing that it did not work because the US and 
China did not agree to it. The EU and Australia remained to stay for the second 
commitment period 2013–20, and agreed to make further emission cuts by 20% 
and 0.5%, respectively.
The Paris Agreement for the period after 2021 was also structured as a 
pledge and review approach to hold the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels through nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs). These NDCs themselves are not legally 
binding, and yet the global stock take process every 5 years is legally binding. 
Global stock take also has a “ratcheting up” mechanism, that requires member 
countries to assess how their new NDCs should evolve, so that they continue to 
move forward with a highest-level ambition. The US–China cooperation for the 
Paris Agreement was already seen in the joint announcement by US President 
Obama and Chinese President Xi at the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) meeting. The US expressed its intention to reduce its 
emissions by 26%–28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to 
reduce its emissions by 28%, while China intended to achieve the peaking of 
CO2 emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and to 
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
20% by 2030.
2. Explaining Competition and Cooperation in the UNFCCC
When the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, China was 10th in the world for 
GDP. In 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, China’s GDP exceeded 
Brazil and it became the seventh largest. After China entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), its economy rapidly grew and it became the third largest 
economy in 2007. When the Cancun Agreements were reached in 2017, China 
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had exceeded Japan and became the second largest economy. In parallel to the 
economic power shift, GHG emissions trends have also changed. Chinese 
emissions were almost equal to those of Russia in 1990, but by 1992 China 
became the second largest emitter. Chinese GHG emissions exceeded EU 
emissions by 2002 and the US by 2004, making China the largest emitter. Thus, 
China’s cooperative position in Paris can be explained by the significance of its 
economic power and some responsibility as the current largest emitter.
The precarious position of the US climate diplomacy is explained by a 
domestic power shift. The Kyoto Protocol, the Cancun Agreements, and the 
Paris Agreement were all promoted by the Democratic Party administrations. 
The US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement when the 
Republican Party was in power. It should be noted that almost a half of state 
governors joined a bipartisan coalition of states, the US Climate Alliance, and 
signed a petition to President Trump to stay in the Paris Agreement. Some of the 
leading companies in the US also strongly urged the Trump administration to 
stay in the Paris Agreement, which would benefit US businesses and the 
economy by strengthening competitiveness, expanding jobs, markets, and 
growth, and reducing business risks.
When DuPont developed alternative chlorofluorocarbons, the US shifted its 
diplomatic position from anti-regulation to pro-regulation on the Montreal 
Protocol. By strengthening the international regulatory regime, the US could 
create new and more profitable chemical markets for the American chemical 
company while responding to the demands from environmental movements. 
This is a typical case of the bootlegger–Baptist model (Yandle and Buck, 2001). 
Alternative chemicals contributed to easing the stratospheric ozone layer 
depletion, and yet had high global warming potential (GWP). That is one of the 
business interests that explains why the US was reluctant to reduce the GHG 
emissions.
A higher GWP is crucial for climate impact even with a relatively small 
amount of GHG emissions, while a large amount of GHG emissions is also 
crucial even with relatively low GWP. In this sense, CO2 emissions from fossil 
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fuel combustion are still key stakes in industrial and economic interests for the 
large-emitting countries. Especially noteworthy is the concentration of the 
world’s top coal producers, consumers, and exporters in the region. China is the 
world’s largest producer and consumer in the global coal market, and India, the 
US, Australia, Indonesia, and Russia have large interests in exporting coal. 
While alternative renewable sources of energy supply are growing, they have 
not yet successfully led to a phase-out strategy of coal and other fossil fuels in 
the region. The development of US shale oil and gas and Japan’s “clean coal” 
technology is argued to be energy efficient and environment friendly per unit 
cost, and yet the Jevons paradox can occur if demands also increase. Renewables 
are much more efficient and effective both environmentally and politically. That 
is why state-level US governors, and business and civil society leaders continue 
to increase renewables. By so doing, the US can guarantee future competitive 
edges in renewables after shale oil and gas are exhausted.
By the 2010 UNFCCC COP-14 in Cancun, the proposals for efficient, fair, 
and effective mitigation criteria appear exhausted. In the three-pillar model of 
sustainable development, emissions, GDP, and population represent the three 
dimensions. In the environmental dimension, emissions should be the criteria for 
the polluter pays principle. G-77 and China argued that historical emissions 
since the industrial revolution should be the indicator as this would allow 
developing countries some space for growth. Developed countries argued that 
the baseline should be 1990, rather than pre-industrial, due to the principle of 
nonretroactivity.
In terms of the beneficiary pays principle, the size of populations who have 
enjoyed socioeconomic benefits by emitting GHGs should be taken into account. 
A socially bearable indicator that reflects the efforts for energy efficiency of the 
population could be emissions per capita. In terms of the ability-to-pay principle, 
the responsibility between developed and developing countries can be 
differentiated by the economy size. An economically viable indicator that 
reflects the size of the economy could be emissions per GDP by country. If both 
population and GDP are taken into account, an environmentally, socially, and 
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economically equitable indicator could be emissions per GDP per capita. Thus, 
the debate on the application of the common but differentiated responsibility has 
become complicated in practice, and eventually, no convergence emerged among 
member states with different degrees of emissions, population, and economy 
size. This situation has split the climate change regimes into the Cancun 
Agreements and the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
Unlike the emissions reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement aims at “holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.” The 2°C target is not enough, 
however, both environmentally and politically. The more desirable 1.5°C target, 
which was strongly claimed by the small island developing states, was degraded 
as “pursuing efforts.” In addition, the historical responsibility argument calling 
for the pre-industrial levels as the baseline was reflected in the Paris Agreement. 
As compared with the cause-focused emission reduction target, the effect-
focused target is more environmentally direct and politically agreeable. More 
importantly, the shift from the three pillars of the sustainable development 
paradigm to the new cognitive paradigm of planetary boundaries is notable in 
the Paris Agreement.
A similar cognitive shift can also be seen in China’s approach to “ecological 
civilization.” The concept explicitly appeared in the 2012 Congress of the 
Communist Party of China. After the US announced its withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement, Xi Jinping further stressed the “ecological civilization” 
concept and the climate change governance. Without this ideational shift, 
Chinese leadership in the Paris Agreement would not be possible.
III. Biodiversity
1. Competition and Cooperation in the CBD
The early conventions on conservation, such as the Ramsar Convention and 
the World Heritage Convention, were deposited with UNESCO. It was in the 
1970s when the US took the lead in the CITES negotiations. Conservation 
biology emerged in the middle of the 1980s in the US. A wider concept of 
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biological diversity spread into the IUCN and the UNEP, which started 
intergovernmental negotiations on biodiversity in the early 1990s. In the 
beginning, the US was cooperative in creating an umbrella treaty, which could 
streamline the preexisting biodiversity-related treaties. However, when the 
negotiations resulted in the adoption of the CBD in 1992, US President Bush did 
not sign it in Rio. In the following year, President Clinton signed it, but the CBD 
has never been submitted for a ratification vote on the Senate floor. The US has 
been attending the CBD meetings with observer status.
Without an official membership by the US, little progress was made in the 
CBD during the first several years. In the 2000s, notable progress was seen with 
the leadership of the EU and like-minded megadiverse countries. Those being, 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopted in 2000, the 2010 Target adopted 
in 2002, and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the Nagoya Protocol on ABS, the 
Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol, the last three of which were 
adopted in 2010. The responses to the tragedy of the commons or res nullius —
fragile hotspots for ecosystems, red lists of endangered species, biohazard and 
biopiracy of genetic resources—can be summarized in accordance with the 
market-based “private goods” approach, the regulatory “public goods” approach, 
and the cooperative governance approach to new commons or res communis. 
For instance, in managing the pathways of invasive alien species, the blacklist 
approach contains the species whose introduction is strictly limited and 
regulated. In contrast, the white list approach contains the species whose 
introduction may be allowed based on their risk assessment. The preventive and 
adaptive approach may be called a gray approach, in which both precaution and 
adaptive changes could be arranged in the changing ecosystem situations.
As for biosafety, when the WTO was launched in 1995, the CBD COP-2 
meeting established the ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety to start negotiating 
on a biosafety protocol. The first commercial sales of patented genetically 
modified tomatoes began in the US in 1994. While advantages of biotechnology 
were increasingly recognized, its potential risks to biodiversity and human 
health were also widely shared as a biohazard. Thus, the Cartagena Protocol 
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explicitly reemphasized the precautionary principle by which the lack of 
scientific certainty shall not be used as an excuse to postpone preventive 
measures. The Cartagena Protocol focuses on a series of rules and procedures 
for the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) 
because domestic regulations on LMOs and their risk management vary across 
countries. Faced with the start of LMO export from the US, the EU introduced 
stringent regulations from the late 1990s. International cooperation on biosafety 
was also important for many developing countries in domestically implementing 
such kinds of norms. The negotiations ended without adopting a protocol in 
1999 in Cartagena due to the competition among the Miami Group (US, 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay) of LMO-exporting countries with 
competitive biotechnology industries, the Like-Minded Group (G-77 and China 
with large populations and megadiverse hotspots), and the EU. The Compromise 
Group (Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Singapore, New 
Zealand), which had a high level of biodiversity and bioindustries, sought to 
bridge the gap. The efforts resulted in the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol in 
2000 in Montreal. 
An unresolved issue on the Cartagena Protocol was international rules and 
procedures of liability and redress for damage from a transboundary movement 
of LMOs. After the 6-year negotiations from 2004, the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol was adopted in 2010. Two outstanding issues related to 
liability and redress were the concepts of “product thereof” and “financial 
security.” LMO-importing countries, such as Malaysia and Africa (except South 
Africa), argued that liability and redress should cover not only LMOs themselves 
but also “products thereof.” Japan and the EU took the position of a scientific 
evidence-based mechanism for the liability issue. The phrase “products thereof” 
was eventually deleted from the Supplementary Protocol (as already included in 
the Cartagena Protocol), while “a causal link shall be established” between the 
damage and the LMO in question in accordance with domestic law. Malaysia 
also supported an administrative approach to “financial security” to cover 
potential liability exceeding the level of operator’s capacities, while Brazil and 
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other LMO exporters opposed. The compromise made in the Supplementary 
Protocol was that the member countries “retain the right to provide, in their 
domestic law, for financial security … in a manner consistent with their rights 
and obligations under international law.”
The Strategic Plan was not mentioned in the CBD, but the COP-6 adopted 
in 2002 the Strategic Plan to carry out the target “to achieve by 2010 a 
significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biological diversity.” With the 
failure of the 2010 Target, the COP-10 adopted the Strategic Plan 2011–2020 
with the Aichi Targets, which use the five strategic goals of Cause, Pressure, 
Status, Benefit, and Implementation, following a holistic framework of Drivers-
Pressures-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) adopted by the European 
Environmental Agency (Maxim et al., 2009). The Strategic Plan is not legally 
binding, but the most contentious issue was resource mobilization (IISD, 2010, 
p. 27). Developed countries preferred innovative financial mechanisms, such as 
biodiversity offsetting and a Green Development Mechanism, which was 
modeled after the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM. For developed countries, 
mainstreaming of the valuation of ecosystem services is also effective for 
biodiversity conservation, as demonstrated by The Economics of Ecosystem and 
Biodiversity (TEEB) study (Kumar ed., 2002). In contrast, developing countries 
opposed the market-based approach, partly because most developing countries 
had negative experiences of the CDM scheme. The group of Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Americas strongly opposed the “commodification” of nature, which 
would result in further environmental destruction and human rights violations. 
In Nagoya, the concept of an innovative financial mechanism was dropped, 
while TEEB was used for the Aichi Targets. 
The ABS issue remained unresolved for a long time. A panel of experts on 
ABS was created in 1998, and the WSSD called for the negotiations of an 
international ABS regime under the CBD. The COP-7 meeting agreed in 2004 to 
provide the ad hoc Working Group on ABS the mandate to start negotiations on 
the design of an ABS regime. In 2006, the COP instructed the ABS negotiation 
group to complete its work to prepare an ABS regime before the 2010 deadline. 
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The key conflicting point in the ABS Protocol was that developed countries with 
a competitive biological industry wanted to guarantee “access” to genetic 
resources while developing countries with diversified genetic resources wanted 
“benefit-sharing.” Concrete conflicts included derivatives, retroactive 
applications, compliance, and traditional knowledge. While developed countries 
argued that the utilization of derivatives of genetic resources should be judged 
on a case-by-case basis, developing countries wanted derivatives of genetic 
resources to be covered by the protocol. Developed countries argued that a 
retroactive application of the protocol was against the principle of international 
law, whereas developing countries lobbied for retroactive application. Developed 
countries were worried about burdensome disclosure requirements for 
compliance of businesses, while developing countries requested that one or 
more checkpoints for compliance should be established in each country. 
Developed countries argued that benefit-sharing of publicly available traditional 
knowledge could be suggested, while the Like-Minded Asia-Pacific Group 
preferred that it is required.
The text of the Nagoya Protocol was filled with ambiguity by deleting 
contentious words and phrases or by providing a broader definition. The terms 
“retroactive application” and “benefit-sharing of publicly available traditional 
knowledge” disappeared from the text of the ABS Protocol. On the one hand, 
the utilization of derivatives can be assessed on a case-by-case basis as requested 
by developed countries. One or more checkpoints are to be established as 
requested by developing countries.
2. Explaining Competition and Cooperation in the CBD
At the international system level, without the US as a formal CBD member, 
the relative weight of the presence of the G-77 and China was high. In 2002, 
Mexico took the Cancun initiative and declared the establishment of the Group 
of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries by developing countries and China. 
Some developed countries, such as Japan and New Zealand, have great 
biological diversity and hotspots as well, and yet Japan, New Zealand, and South 
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Korea also have a competitive biological industry.
At the domestic level, a political power shift is also important. For instance, 
the diplomatic position change of Japan on biosafety was one factor for 
cooperation. This is partly because of the regime shift in Tokyo from a business-
supported LDP-led government to a union-supported Democratic Party of Japan 
government, and partly because Japan’s presidency wanted to prevent Nagoya 
from becoming another Copenhagen, where climate negotiations failed in the 
previous year. Many delegates to Nagoya felt that a further prolonged stalemate 
on key issues would not be in their interests. 
As for biosafety, without the US as the world’s largest LMO producer, the 
largest pro-LMO party has been Brazil, followed by Argentina. Canada and 
Australia are also LMO-producing countries. The ruling of the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC, 2004) revealed the complex lawsuit case of Monsanto Canada 
Inc. vs. Schmeiser (a farmer) with conflicting interests between the “biopiracy” 
use of LMOs and the “biohazard” contamination by LMOs. As the world’s 
largest organic farming country, Australia also has complex interests in LMO 
and non-LMO food and crops. For Malaysia and other food-importing countries, 
international regulations of LMOs, especially liability, have been strong 
concerns, and yet the changing food economy due to the pressure of increased 
population, climate change, and the increased food prices in the 2008 global 
financial and food crises reflected more-flexible attitudes toward LMOs by 
importing countries. A similar interest structure can be found in the “benefit-
sharing” of genetic resources over which megadiverse developing countries 
have sovereign rights. Korea, Japan, and New Zealand – besides the US – have 
a notable number of biotechnology companies that have interests in “access” to 
genetic resources. China also has increased R&D in biotechnology. In terms of 
biodiversity hotspots, the Asia-Pacific region has the largest number and areas of 
hotspot initiatives, especially marine hotspots.
The three pillars of sustainable development appear not always well 
integrated into the CBD. The three objectives of the CBD represent the 
overlapping areas of environmental, social, and economic dimensions. The 
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conservation of biological diversity indicates the intersection of environment 
and economics. To conserve does not always mean to protect untouched nature 
as deep ecology suggests, although protected areas of wild nature are also 
understood as necessary for conservation. TEEB is quite compatible with 
conservation overlapping environmental and economic issues. The sustainable 
“use” of biodiversity’s components represents the social dimension. The concept 
of “biosafety” in the Cartagena Protocol overlaps environmental and social/
human dimensions. The benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, 
which is a part of the Nagoya Protocol, overlaps the financial benefits of the 
biotechnology industry and the social benefits of consumers and indigenous 
peoples. If the benefit-sharing refers only to economic and social benefits, and 
not for the environment, it is not an environmental agreement.
The vision statement of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, “Living in Harmony 
with Nature,” looks like a bold moonshot. However, planetary boundaries 
updated for genetic diversity indicate a high-risk zone, whereas global-level 
functional diversity cannot yet be measured. Without planetary boundaries 
identified social and economic boundaries will face difficulties to reach an 
agreement. The epistemic community of biodiversity was delayed in being 
formed compared with climate change. In 2008, the Parties discussed the 
establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services  ( IPBES),  which is  an  equivalent  of  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change established in 1988.
IV. Whaling
1. Competition and Cooperation in the IWC
The origin of the international regulation of whaling dates back to the 1930s 
when a blue whale unit (BWU) was used to measure the relative amount of 
whale oil yields by whaling companies in the Atlantic Ocean. The IWC, 
established in 1948, based on the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW) also used BWU during the period 1948–1972, for the “proper 
conservation of whale stocks.” The BWU catch limit was set, without a scientific 
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rationale, in the area for the Antarctic pelagic whaling, and therefore overfishing 
and competition could occur on a first come, first catch basis.
The UNCHE adopted a resolution calling for a 10-year moratorium on 
commercial whaling, as proposed by the US, which also enacted the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act at home in the same year. The IWC meetings following 
the UNCHE rejected the proposals from the US for zero quotas in 1972 and 
moratorium on commercial whaling in 1973 and 1974 and instead created in 
1975 the New Management Procedure (NMP). The NPM set catch limit by 
species with reference to the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) level. The 
MSY concept was expected to be operationalized scientifically, and yet it was 
revealed that it was difficult to identify it. With the proposal from the Seychelles, 
the IWC established in 1979 the Indian Ocean Whale Sanctuary.
In the context of increasingly decreased stock, the IWC adopted a 
moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982. Canada withdrew from the IWC, 
and Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union opposed the moratorium. Peru 
withdrew its objection in 1983, and Japan in 1986. The IWC also allowed 
whaling quotas for aboriginal subsistence and scientific whaling. Japan carried 
out scientific whaling in the Antarctic (JARPA) and in the North Pacific 
(JARPAN).
The Revised Management Procedure (RMP) was adopted by the IWC’s 
Scientific Committee in 1992, when the UNCED was held. In 1994, the IWC 
adopted the RMP, which was based on a catch limit algorithm and 
implementation review, and a Revised Management Scheme, which included 
monitoring and surveillance measures. The IWC also adopted in 1994 the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary. Despite these decisions, the controversy between 
pro-whaling and anti-whaling countries continued.
The Conservation Committee established in 2003 became another addition 
to the controversy. To address the main discrepancies, the IWC decided in 2007 
to start the “Future of the IWC” process. However, no substantial progress was 
made and it was decided in 2012 to have the IWC plenary biannually rather than 
annually. The salient conflict was seen between Australia and Japan. In 2004 an 
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Australian conservation group brought a litigation case against Japan’s whaling 
within the Australian Sanctuary in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In 2008, 
the Australian Federal Court decided against Japan, but the Japanese government 
did not recognize the Australian jurisdiction. Separately, in 2011, Australia 
challenged Japan’s scientific whaling before the ICJ, and the ICJ ruling of 2014 
concluded that the special permits granted by Japan in connection with JARPAII 
are not for purposes of scientific research. Japan submitted to the IWC in 2014 a 
new scientific whaling plan in the Antarctic. In 2017, Japan submitted a similar 
plan in the Northeastern Pacific and enacted a new domestic law for scientific 
whaling. In 2018, Japan gave notice of its intended withdrawal from the IWC in 
2019.
2. Explaining Competition and Cooperation in the IWC
In terms of power, calling for a moratorium on commercial whaling was 
adopted in Stockholm with the skillful leadership of Maurice Strong, UNCHE 
Secretary-General, with the changing position within the US administration on 
whaling. However, the proposal of a moratorium was not adopted at the 1972 
IWC meeting, partly because the power of the whaling countries was still 
dominant, and partly because the US power started declining in the early 1970s. 
The power gap in the region was supported by cooperation between the US and 
Australia, which advocated further regulations. The power of environmental 
NGOs was emerging to change the diplomatic positions both in the US and in 
Canada, but it worked for Canada to withdraw from the IWC because the 
country was not involved in commercial whaling. Australia’s case against 
Japan’s scientific whaling at the ICJ was made under the Rudd government 
(Australian Labor Party). The Abbott government (Liberal Party of Australia) 
did not highly politicize the whaling issue when Prime Minister Abbott visited 
Japan to meet Prime Minister Abe (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). However, 
Australia’s claim on its EEZ and territorial waters, and Japan’s claim on the 
public sea in the Antarctic remain unresolved. Japan’s decision to withdraw from 
the IWC is explained mainly by Japan’s domestic politics. LDP’s Secretary-
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General Nikai and Prime Minister Abe decided to restart commercial whaling 
and to withdraw from the IWC. Nikai represented Wakayama Prefecture, where 
Japan’s traditional whaling birthplace, Taiji, is located. Prime Minister Abe was 
elected from Yamaguchi Prefecture, where Japan’s modern whaling birthplace, 
Shimonoseki, is located. 
The combined interests of the bootleggers–Baptists model might explain the 
US whaling policy shift in the early 1970s. Sperm oil was consumed as a 
lubricant for military use (missiles) and commercial use (automobile 
transmission bearings), and that is why the Soviet Union and Japan took the pro-
whaling position, respectively. The US also had the same stance, and yet when 
Sun Oil developed an alternative lubricant in 1971, the Republican Congressmen 
representing their interests exerted their influence actively to support the US 
government’s policy for anti-whaling in the CITES and the ICRW (Umezaki, 
1986). By banishing sperm oil from the market, sales for the alternative lubricant 
made by Sun Oil were expected to increase. It is also in the interests of 
environmental NGOs based on animal welfare, animal rights, or the 
precautionary principle.
The interests of Japanese whaling “culture” look socially created by the 
media and the Japanese government. It was in the immediate postwar period that 
whale meat occupied about 45% of total meat consumption in Japan (Ishii and 
Sanada, 2015, p. 26). By the middle of the 1960s its fraction decreased to 20%, 
and at best 6% by 1980. It is not in the diplomatic interest of the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry to withdraw from the IWC, partly because it will hurt Japan’s 
credibility in multilateral diplomacy, and partly because a proposal for the exact 
same consequence of suspending scientific whaling in the public sea and 
resuming commercial whaling within Japan’s EEZ was recommended by the 
IWC Chair two decades ago.
More importantly than power and interests, the whaling controversy is 
deeply rooted in ideational differences on sustainability. The ratios of 1 BWU 
being equal to 2 fin whales, 2.5 humpback whales, or 6 sei whales were based 
on the relative amounts of sperm whale’s head oil that each species yields, and 
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therefore reflected on the whaling industry’s economic dimension. The MSY 
concept was a reflection of both population ecology and the economic 
dimensions of whaling. However, it was criticized by conservation ecology 
because key factors, such as reproductive status and ecosystem damages, were 
ignored. The IWC Scientific Committee developed an RMP aiming at optimizing 
a stable catch limit, while balancing risk aversion and investment, with a 
compliance scheme. Based on the precautionary approach and/or animal welfare, 
a temporal moratorium and spacious whale sanctuary were suggested for the 
environmental dimension, while aboriginal subsistence whaling was allowed for 
the social dimension. Scientific whaling was also allowed, but a convergence 
between the scientific and policy communities remains unresolved.
V. Conclusion
Asia and the Pacific have become the center of the most dynamically 
growing economies in this century. The mode of mass production and mass 
consumption in the 20th century was also accompanied by mass emissions and 
mass extinctions. The nexus of shifting power, complex interests, and changing 
worldview ideas can account for the competition and cooperation on 
environmental problems in the region, although the relative weights of these 
three causal variables are different across the issue areas. It will be necessary to 
examine the external validity of the nexus model to other important 
environmental issues in the region, such as ocean plastic pollution.
We can draw from the case studies at least three policy implications: 
renovation, innovation, and transformation. First, if hegemonic power is still 
needed to provide and maintain international public goods for environmental 
cooperation, we need renovation of the power structure in the region. In so 
doing, regional or interregional frameworks, such as the APEC, could be used 
for the US and China to be re-engaged or further engaged in environmental 
cooperation. It is also important to empower domestic advocacy groups, 
including local governments and non-state actors, to persuade decision-makers 
in favor of environmental cooperation in the region.
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Second, technological and policy innovations are needed for reconstructing 
interest in environmental cooperation. When dominant powers recognize the 
best available technology as their interests, policy change and innovations for 
multilateral environmental cooperation could emerge. Renewable energy and 
green chemistry would be sources for such innovations.
Last but not least, transformation in worldviews is needed. To transform our 
world in the Anthropocene, we need to go beyond the three-pillar model of 
sustainable development into a new paradigm of prospering within planetary 
boundaries. Before the industrial revolution reached the Asia-Pacific region, 
where many biodiversity hotspots are concentrated, the indigenous culture of 
living in harmony with the nature associated with both inland and ocean 
ecosystems, was dominant in the region. 
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<Summary>
Katsuhiko Mori
This article analyzes the complex interplay between competition and 
cooperation on critical environmental issues on the atmosphere, the biosphere, 
and the hydrosphere in Asia and the Pacific. For the atmospheric environment, 
the power transition between the US and China observed over the last three 
decades impacted the climate change negotiations. In this process, the contention 
about the Kyoto Protocol was turned into cooperation on the Paris Agreement 
between the world’s two largest emitters. In the field of the land biosphere, 
increased resource use for the developed and emerging economies causes 
degradation and loss of ecosystem services in the megadiverse countries in the 
region. For life in the hydrosphere, the gaps in scientific knowledge and 
evidence-based understanding of the causes of overhunting led to Japan’s 
withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission. Thus, a varied 
combination of power, economic interests, and ideas can account for the 
competition–cooperation dynamism in the environmental issues in the Asia-
Pacific region. It is argued that effective environmental governance requires not 
only the renewal of cooperation but also innovative and transformative changes 
in the region.

